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MICHAEL L. MOFFITT*
What, if anything, reasonably provides mediation consumers with
confidence about the quality of mediators' services?
The expansion and maturation of mediation as a practice has
understandably (and laudably) led many to begin to focus attention on
questions of quality assurance.1 Assuring high-quality practice has been no
easy undertaking for any set of practitioners. As evidence of this proposition,
consider that even the professions that have been recognized for centuries
(doctors and lawyers, for example) still continually modify their approaches
to quality assurance. Although no practice group can claim to have "solved"
the difficult question, many have been at it for far longer than mediation. So,
those who care about mediation might wisely look to other practices or
professions for indicators of what mechanisms are most effective.
This article begins, therefore, with an exploration of how consumers
derive confidence in the services of practitioners outside of mediation. Why
are we confident that the doctor we have chosen will not be lousy? The
lawyer? The plumber? The tattoo artist? It turns out that, regardless of the
context, whatever confidence we have in the quality of these practitioners'
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services derives from one of four sources, each of which I describe in Section
I.
A careful look at these available mechanisms, however, reveals that none
of them currently operates as effectively for mediation as they do for other
practices and professions. In Section II, I explain the current failures of these
mechanisms in the context of mediation. Some mechanisms fail because of
the nature of mediation practice. Some fail because of the nature of current
regulation or common law doctrines related to mediation. Some fail because
of the current shape of the market for mediators. None of these failures, taken
independently, would be all that troublesome. After all, most practices and
professions rely on a patchwork of different mechanisms for guarding against
incompetence. Only the fact that all four of the mechanisms fail in the
context of mediation makes this a remarkable and unsustainable condition.
To be clear, this is not an anti-mediation manifesto--quite the contrary. I
write this as one who has staked his professional career on the fundamental
integrity and importance of mediation. I am certainly not making an
empirical claim that the quality of mediation services is inferior in some way
to other kinds of services. In fact, I firmly believe that many mediators do an
outstanding job, and that, in many cases, mediation consumers will be
delighted with their mediation choices.
This is, however, a cautionary article. Many of the practices and
professions I have studied went through a period of similar insulation from
quality assurance mechanisms. As more and more people become consumers
of mediation services-and all indications are that this trend will continue-
the demand for some kinds of assurance of quality will also increase. The
practice of medicine looks quite different than it did seventy-five years ago.
The practice of law looks quite different than it did fifty years ago. The
practice of body artistry looks quite different than it did twenty-five years
ago. The practice of mediation will look different, too.
In Section III of this article, I hypothesize about the changes that would
have to take place in order for one or more of the four basic quality assurance
mechanisms to be effective in the context of mediation. Although the article
does not descend fully into the academic parlor game of predicting the
precise nature of the future, I also point to some trends in mediation and in
other professions that may cast light on the possible future shape(s) of
mediation.
By understanding how quality assurance works in other practices, and by
understanding how those mechanisms have evolved over time, we gain an
important set of insights about the possible future(s) of mediation. Building
on the descriptive and predictive components of this inquiry, we can then
responsibly engage in a conversation about what that future ought to look
like.
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Mediators today operate with few market restrictions, few controls on
their conduct, and few consequences for misbehavior. This condition will not
persist.
I. THE FOUR MECHANISMS FOR ASSURING THE QUALITY OF SERVICES
Each profession or practice2 has a set of mechanisms which, in
combination, serve to provide some assurance about the quality of its
practitioners' services. Some of these mechanisms are formal, the products of
conscious design by members of the practice or by regulators. Other
mechanisms are less formal, relying on voluntary participation or individual
decisions. The precise nature of these mechanisms varies, of course, with
each practice. What causes us to have confidence in doctors is not the same
set of mechanisms that causes us to have confidence in accountants, much
less those that justify confidence in truck drivers.
All of these context-specific mechanisms for assuring quality services,
however, are variations on one of four themes. Put differently, there are only
four basic approaches to assuring quality in a particular practice. To highlight
the connections and distinctions between these mechanisms, I offer the
following two-by-two grid, illustrating the four ways to assure quality.
2 1 am aware that some within the mediation community are engaged in a robust
public debate about whether mediation is, or should be, viewed as a profession. For
example, the ABA's Dispute Resolution Magazine featured a series of viewpoints on the
issue in its Spring 2005 issue. Compare Craig McEwen, Giving Meaning to Mediator
Professionalism, DIsp. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2005, at 3 and Sarah Rudolph Cole,
Mediator Certification: Has the Time Come?, DIsp. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2005, at 7, with
Margret L. Shaw, Style Schmyle! What's Evaluation Got to Do With It?, DiSP. REsOL.
MAG., Spring 2005, at 17. See also Forrest S. Mosten, Institutionalization of Mediation,
42 FAM. CT. REV. 292, 293 (2004); Nancy A. Welsh & Bobbi McAdoo, Eyes on the
Prize: The Struggle for Professionalism, DIsp. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2005, at 13; Juliana
Birkoff et. al, Points of View: Is Mediation Really a Profession?, DIsP. RESOL. MAG., Fall
2001, at 10. My intention is not to join that debate with this article, although I recognize
that some will read it in that light. In this article, I will speak, whenever possible, about
"practice areas," an umbrella term that will encompass both recognized professions and
practices that do not meet one or more of the competing definitions of a profession.
Whether mediation is a "profession" should not affect the degree to which the mediation
community cares about the quality of mediation services.
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Table 1: The Four Ways to Assure Quality Services
Front-End Back-End
(steps aimed at assuring (steps aimed at assuring
quality by limiting the quality by punishing or
initial pool to those removing from practice
practitioners deemed those whose conduct is
competent or qualified) deemed unacceptable)
Public
(steps taken by 1 2
the state)
Private
(steps taken by 3 4
private parties or
organizations)
In the sections below, I outline the operation of each of these four
mechanisms in practices other than mediation, for the purpose of clarifying
the framework. In Section II, I then apply the framework and the
mechanisms it suggests to the context of mediation.
A. Public-Front-End Mechanisms
The public, through the vehicle of a government entity, takes an active
role in assuring the quality of many different kinds of services. One of the
most visible public mechanisms involves using the machinery of the
government to exclude certain categories of people from providing the
services in question. These are, in terms of the framework I have presented,
"public-front-end mechanisms." Licensure regimes, in all of their various
forms, are the most prominent example of public-front-end mechanisms.
Different governmental bodies are responsible for creating and
maintaining the integrity of a licensure regime, depending on the practice in
question. In a small number of cases, the license comes from the federal
government. For example, gun brokers, radioactive waste haulers, and certain
meat inspectors require federal licenses.3 In many of the most prominently
recognized professions, the license comes from the state. For example,
doctors must have a state-issued license to practice medicine legally.4
3 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) (2000) (federal firearm licensure); 10 C.F.R. § 71
(2008) (nuclear material transportation); 7 C.F.R. § 868.80 (2008) (meat inspectors).
4 See, e.g., AM. MED. AWS'N, STATE LIcENsURE AND STATIsTIcs 2007 (Fred Donini-
Lenhoff ed., Am. Educ. Prod. 2007); see also Federation of State Medical Boards, State-
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Similarly, lawyers must be licensed by the specific jurisdiction(s) in which
they want to practice. In some cases, the licensing is done at a more local
level. For example, tattoo artists are sometimes regulated at the municipal
level, rather than at the state level. 5
One aspect of a licensed practice is that the licensure requirements
typically erect a barrier to entry into the practice. A doctor must pass a set of
Board exams. 6 A lawyer must pass the Bar exam. A psychologist must
satisfactorily complete a period of supervised employment. 7 A cosmetologist
must complete a specified course of education.8 In theory, by creating this
barrier to entry into the practice, the state is taking steps that will improve the
quality of services-by keeping out those whom the state believes will not
perform satisfactorily.9
specific Requirements for Initial Medical Licensure, available at
http://www.fsmb.org/usmleeliinitial.html.
5 See, e.g., Cambridge Public Health Department, Body Art Regulations (Jan. 31,
2001), available at http://www.cambridgepublichealth.org/services/regulatory-
activities/body-art/body-art-regulations.php. However, in other jurisdictions, tattoo artists
are regulated by state agencies, rather than at the municipal level. See, e.g., Advisory
Council for Electrologists, Permanent Color Technicians and Tattoo Artists,
http://egov.oregon.gov/OHLA/EPT/index.shtml (last visited April 28, 2009).
6 See, e.g., U.S. Med. Licensing Examination, 2008 Bulletin of Information,
http://www.usmle.org/GeneralInformation/bulletin/2008.html (last visited April 28,
2009).
7 See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2914 (West 2003) (applicants must engage in at
least two years of supervised professional experience under the direction of a licensed
psychologist, with at least one year being completed after receiving their doctorate in
psychology); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 119 (West 2004) (applicants must fulfill
at least two years full time work, with at least one year that is subsequent to receiving
their doctoral degree, in psychology employment, teaching, research, or professional
practice under the supervision of a licensed psychologist, or a person that is clearly
eligible for licensure in the opinion of the state licensing board); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 675.030 (2005) (a license will only be issued if an applicant can demonstrate two years
of supervised employment under an Oregon licensed psychologist, or another person
considered by the licensing board to have supervisory competence).
8 See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7321 (West 1995) (applicants must complete a
course in cosmetology from a school approved by the Board of Barbering and
Cosmetology; this course of study must include 1,600 course hours); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 112, § 87V (West 2004) (to be registered as a student operator, an applicant
must complete at least six months of course work that includes at least 1,000 hours of
professional training for a hairdresser and 300 hours of professional training for an
aesthetician); OR. ADMiN. R. 817-030-0005 (2008) (applicants for certification must
complete specified course hours within their field of specialty: hair design-1,450 hour
course; barbering-l, 100 hour course; esthetics-250 hour course; and nail technology-
350 hour course).
9 To be sure, consumer protection is only one of the motives one might reasonably
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Just as the state may exclude certain people from the practice by erecting
an initial barrier, it may also impose ongoing obligations on those who wish
to perform the services in question. For example, virtually every state has a
continuing education requirement for physicians and for attorneys.' 0 And
these kinds of requirements extend beyond the traditionally recognized
professions to include practices like those of accountants and school
counselors, both of which require a state license in order to practice in certain
contexts, and both of which also require continuing education. 11
All public-front-end mechanisms share a fundamental goal-to exclude
those who have not met whatever prima facie evidence of competence the
state has established. Some mechanisms exclude those who cannot
demonstrate initial competence. Some exclude those who do not have an
educational or experience background the state believes necessary for the
practice in question. Some exclude those who have not fulfilled continuing
education or other requirements for maintaining the state's license to
practice. To the extent that these mechanisms assure the quality of services,
they do so by excluding some of the putative practitioners about whom we
might have concerns. In essence, they restrict the pool of people available to
provide the service.
B. Public-Back-End Mechanisms
In addition to restricting access to a license to practice, the state
sometimes takes steps to punish those practitioners whose conduct falls
below a state-established minimum level of competence. These measures,
which I label "public-back-end mechanisms," also have the effect of
improving the quality of services. Instead of initially excluding from practice
people that the state believes to be suspect, the state uses these mechanisms
to target those who have actually acted in a demonstrably troublesome way.
attribute for establishing barriers to entry into the market. Many have accused
professionals of making it difficult to enter the profession as a means of limiting
competitors, for example. Nevertheless, even if the motives for entrance restrictions are
mixed, one of the motives almost certainly has something to do with consumer
protection.
10 See, e.g., AM. MED. ASS'N, supra note 4; see also Fed'n of State Med. Bds., supra
note 4; American Bar Association, Mandatory Continuing Legal Education,
http://www.abanet.org/cle/mandatory.html (last visited April 28, 2009).
11 See, e.g., American School Counselor Association, Continuing Education
Requirements, http://www.schoolcounselor.org/content.asp?contentid=243 (last visited
April 28, 2009); WASH. ADMtN. CODE 4-25-830 (2005); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 20-11-.02
(2005); see also Georgia Secretary of State, Continuing Professional Education
Requirements for CPAs, RPAs, and Foreign Accountants,
http://sos.georgia.gov/plb/accountancy/cont-ed.htm (last visited April 28, 2009).
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Perhaps the easiest example of a public-back-end mechanism is the
procedure every state Bar maintains for dealing with after-the-fact
complaints against attorneys. A relatively minor infraction of the relevant
legal ethics principles exposes an attorney to a relatively minor punishment.
But as the seriousness of the infraction increases, so do the sanctions. For the
worst offenses, attorneys who commit malpractice are at risk of having her or
his license suspended or revoked.' 12
The same basic mechanism-revocation of a license-looms as a threat
over essentially all licensed practices. A stock broker's licenses can be
revoked if the broker is convicted of embezzlement. 13 A real estate agent
who is convicted of forgery or extortion risks losing his or her license. 14 If a
funeral director commits a certain class of felony, he or she risks losing his or
her license. 15 And the licenses for a host of different kinds of practitioners
are at risk if the practitioner is convicted of a crime "involving moral
turpitude."'1 6 In short, what the state gives (a license), the state can take away
(under certain conditions, like misconduct). As a result, this public-back-end
mechanism improves the quality of services by removing from practice those
people it deems lousy.
Not all public-back-end mechanisms result in revocation of a state
license to practice, however. Indeed, not all public-back-end mechanisms
require the existence of any licensure regime whatsoever. For example, no
license is required to serve as the officer of a public company. 17 And yet,
12 See Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems, 2006 A.B.A. CTR PROF'L RESP., Chart
11 (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/discipline/sold/06-ch2.pdf (In 2006 a
total of 1,903 lawyers were privately sanctioned and 4,309 lawyers were publicly
sanctioned. Of the lawyers publicly sanctioned 551 were involuntarily disbarred, 342
were disbarred on consent, 1,361 were suspended, and 451 were temporarily suspended
for risk of harm or criminal conviction).
13 See, e.g., Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, NASD By-Laws of the
Corporation, art. 3, § 4 (2007), available at
http://fmra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&elementid=4598.
14 See, e.g., OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 4735.13 (West 2004); Dougherty v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania State Real Estate Comm'n., 513 A.2d 555 (Pa. 1986);
Kelley v. Real Estate Comm'n., 172 A.2d 415 (D.C. 1961).
15 See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-1301(54) (2008); Sweeny v. State Bd. of
Funeral Dirs., 666 A.2d 1137 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW
§3450(1)(b) (West 2002).
16 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:5-2 (West 2004) (podiatrists); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 59, § 532 (West 2000) (athletic trainers); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 30-36-18 (LexisNexis
2007) (acupuncturists); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-13-9 (LexisNexis 2001) (midwives); HAW.
CT. REP. R. 10.2(b)(i) (West 2008) (court reporters).
17 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(f) (2006) (noting conditions of when a person is ineligible to
serve as a director).
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when the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) resolves enforcement
actions against such professionals, it is common for the SEC to seek to bar
the party from subsequently serving as an officer or director of a public
company.' 8 Similarly, although no license is required to act as a securities
analyst or mutual fund portfolio manager, SEC enforcement actions'
resolution often includes bans against associating with brokers, dealers,
investment advisers, and mutual fund administrators. 19 One of the most
publicly visible examples of such an action came against Henry Blodget, the
Merrill Lynch financial analyst most heavily associated with some of the
most notorious Enron trading, who was eventually fined $4 million and
banned from the securities industry for life.20 Because participation in a
particular market space (for example, the securities industry)21 often
represents the targeted practitioner's primary source of income, defendants
are often willing to accept fines and other sanctions in exchange for not being
barred from future practice. The state, therefore, can exert influence on the
quality of certain practices through back-end mechanisms, even if no
licensure system exists.22
At their core, public-back-end mechanisms aim to punish unacceptable
behavior in ways that make such behavior less likely in the future. These
18 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2000). For examples
of such regulatory actions, see S.E.C., Other Commission Orders, Notices, and
Information, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other.shtml.
19 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (2000). The precise
mechanism for this bar is not the revocation of a license, because no license exists.
Instead, it is technically an agreement in the negotiated plea, which is then entered as an
order of the court.
20 See Press Release, S.E.C., Securities and Exchange Commission, NASD and the
New York Stock Exchange Permanently Bar Henry Blodget From the Securities Industry
and Require $4 Million Payment (Apr. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-56.htm.
21 This mechanism is not unique to financial analysts. For example, the SEC also
fairly routinely seeks to bar certain people from serving on the boards of directors of
publicly traded companies as a punishment for certain misconduct. See 15 U. S. C.
§ 78u-3(f) (2000). Service as a director can be enormously financially lucrative, and the
threat is therefore substantial. Internationally, regulatory bodies have even greater
statutory authority to restrict practices that require no license. For example, under the
British Companies Act, a director of a company that declares bankruptcy is ineligible
from serving on a subsequent board of directors of a publicly traded company for a
period of years. See BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS & TERRANCE C. HALLIDAY, RESCUING
BUSINESS: THE MAKING OF CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY LAW IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED
STATES 276-83 (1998).
22 A second example of a public-back-end mechanism, in the absence of a licensure
regime, would be the myriad of fines the state can impose for conduct that does not merit
complete removal from practice.
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mechanisms, therefore, are often part of the patchwork of approaches that
assure the quality of services.
C. Private-Front-End Mechanisms
In many practices and professions-even those operating with a
licensing requirement-the government plays a relatively minor role in
assuring consumers of the quality of services. Instead, private or
nongovernmental forces exert an enormous front-end influence on the quality
of the pool of those who provide services.
The most prominent example of these private-front-end mechanisms is
the reputation each service provider holds within the market. If you ask
colleagues how they chose a doctor, odds are good that they will respond
with some variation of, "Other people told me that doctor was good, and I
trusted their judgment." As a quality assurance mechanism, reputations form
an important disincentive for misbehavior. If I am a conspicuously simple-
minded attorney, a shaky-handed tattoo artist, or an innumerate accountant, I
will probably have a hard time attracting future clients. And as a result, I will
eventually leave the field-and in doing so, I will improve the quality of the
pool of people providing services.
Of course, individual practitioners are not always well enough known to
have reputations that would influence consumers' decisions. But, in many
practice areas, reputations attach to firms or collections of practitioners. For
example, it is unlikely that a specific accountant has much of an individual
reputation. Indeed, individual accountants are more likely to gain wide
recognition because of malfeasance than because of reliable, high-quality
services. Accounting firms, by contrast, have market reputations for which
some consumers are willing to pay a premium. 23 The same dynamic is also
likely at play in the market for some kinds of legal services. 24
Collective reputations can stem from voluntary associations as well. For
example, no licensure requirement exists for people who want to sell their
services as financial planners. The market, however, sometimes makes
considerable meaning out of the organizations to which a service provider
does or does not belong. Near the beginning of the most recent downturn in
the real estate market, for example, the National Association of Realtors
23 For example, publicly traded companies routinely seek out highly reputable (and
high-priced) accounting firms as a means of reassuring the markets about the reliability
of the company's numbers. The accounting firm's client, in that case, is capitalizing on
the accounting firm's reputation.
24 See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents:
Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 509 (1994)
(discussing reputation-based cooperation within the practice of law).
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launched a broad advertising campaign, urging consumers to "ask if your
agent is a realtor, a member of the National Association of Realtors." 25 The
idea embedded in the remainder of the advertisements suggested that
members of this organization are of a different (higher) quality than non-
members-even if those nonmembers are legally able to provide the same
range of services as members. Similarly, a Certified Financial Planner is
considered different from a CPA-Personal Financial Specialist, who is in turn
considered different from a Chartered Financial Consultant. 26 The group to
which one belongs, therefore, can serve as something of a proxy for one's
own competence-a reputational consideration.
Private-front-end mechanisms are not always about reputations. In some
cases, private actors other than consumers can influence the people who
provide services. Insurance companies are, perhaps, the clearest example of
this dynamic. Insurers are by no means governmental actors, but if an insurer
tells a medical group that it must adopt a certain practice or exclude a certain
practitioner, that medical group is quite likely to comply. Even though the
insurer has no regulatory power over the practitioners, their influence can
serve to improve the quality of the services being provided.
What private-front-end mechanisms have in common is that they are
nongovernmental influences on who winds up getting work and how
practitioners do their work. As such, they are important mechanisms for
assuring the quality of services.
D. Private-Back-End Mechanisms
The fourth mechanism for assuring the quality of services involves after-
the-fact actions by unhappy consumers against practitioners who have
engaged in allegedly improper behavior. These are actions pursued by private
actors, rather than by government regulators, and they target only those
whom the private actors perceive to be "bad apples."
Malpractice lawsuits are perhaps the most obvious example of a private-
back-end mechanism. Medical professionals once operated with virtually no
risk of liability for their practices. As recently as the 1950s, medical
malpractice insurance was an afterthought, an add-on to doctors'
homeowners and automobile insurance, with the malpractice premiums never
25 Code of Ethics (National Association of Realtors television advertisement 2008),
available at http://www.realtor.org/pac.nsf/pages/television.
26 For the Securities and Exchange Commission's perspective on the differences
among these service providers, see S.E.C., Financial Planners,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/finplan.htm (last visited April 28, 2009).
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constituting more than 1% of the costs of the policies.27 Today, the costs of
medical malpractice insurance (a reasonable proxy for the prominence of
medical malpractice lawsuits) have skyrocketed. 28 The historical trajectory is
similar for attorneys. The first evidence of a legal malpractice insurance
policy being issued was only in 1945, and it was not routine until at least the
1960s. Only since the late 1970s has legal malpractice insurance become
commonplace (and expensive). 29
Even among practices that fall outside of the traditional professions,
malpractice actions loom as a deterrent against incompetent practices. For
example, there has been a surprisingly robust series of lawsuits against
cosmetologists for malpractice ranging from miscolored hair to the improper
use of certain chemicals. 30 Snow removal services have found themselves on
the wrong end of negligence-based lawsuits with some regularity. 3 1 Those
who operate wedding reception venues have been frequent targets of lawsuits
alleging a range of different celebratory inadequacies.
32
27 See Reed Olsen, The Reform of Medical Malpractice Law: Historical
Perspectives, 55 AM. J. OF ECON. & Soc. 257, 259 (1996).
28 The Government Accounting Office provided an analysis of medical malpractice
insurance rates in 2003, noting a "dramatic" increase in recent years. See G.A.O.
Highlights, Medical Malpractice Insurance: Multiple Factors Have Contributed to
Increased Premium Rates (2003), available at
http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d03702high.pdf. These increases have, for some time,
been central to the claims of many supporters of "tort reform" in the medical malpractice
arena. Not all scholars agree that any causal relationship exists between medical
malpractice insurance rates and medical malpractice litigation. See, e.g,, Anthony J.
Sebok, Dispatches from the Tort Wars, 85 TEx. L. REv. 1465 (2007); TOM BAKER, THE
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH (2005).
29 See George Cohen, Legal Malpractice Insurance and Loss Prevention: A
Comparative Analysis of Economic Institutions, 4 CONN. INs. L.J. 305, 307-08 (1997).
Oregon is the only state that requires all practicing lawyers to maintain malpractice
insurance. However, most states require businesses organized as limited liability
partnerships to carry liability insurance, which covers most law firms. Id. at 323 n.65.
30 The history of litigation against cosmetologists is, if the reader will forgive me,
colorful. See, e.g., Baker v. Stewarts' Inc., 433 N.W.2d 706, 707 (Iowa 1988) (injuries
from application of a chemical hair straightening product); Coons v. Farrell, 437 S.W.2d
674, 675 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) (negligent application of a cold wave permanent); Smith v.
Kennedy, 195 So. 2d 820, 824-25 (Ala. Ct. App. 1966) (waving solution causing second-
degree chemical bums.); Wall v. Gill, 225 S.W.2d 670, 671 (Ky. 1949) (permanent wave
resulting in bums).
31 See, e.g., Abbattista v. Kings' Grant Master Ass'n, 833 N.Y.S.2d 592 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2007); Castro v. Maple Run Condominium Ass'n, 837 N.Y.S.2d 729 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2007).
32 See, e.g., Newberg v. Next Level Events, Inc., 110 S.W.3d 332 (Ark. Ct. App.
2003) (overly slippery waxed floors); Roman v. Queen Mary, 2002 WL 787769 (Cal.
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Lawsuits are not the only form that private-back-end mechanisms can
take. In many circumstances, unhappy consumers have one or more avenues
for filing complaints or registering their unhappiness. In some circumstances,
the complaints may go to the organization to which the service provider
belongs, creating the risk that the practitioner will be sanctioned by that
organization. In other cases, the complaint may be to a more general source,
with more limited opportunities for direct sanction, but of course with the
possibility of creating an impact on consumers' decisions. For example, the
Better Business Bureau (BBB) tracks complaints against an enormous
number of different service providers. A prospective consumer can learn a
great deal from the BBB, including whether the plumber, roofer, or
electrician under consideration has been the target of an abnormal number of
complaints recently. The BBB also maintains a list of "accredited"
organizations, which requires a business to meet a set of BBB standards,
including responsiveness to customer concerns. 33
Intemet-based businesses provide diverse examples of rating systems,
many of which are popular, even if the users recognize the limits on the
quality of the information they provide. 34 Even though the threat of direct
sanction is low, practitioners in many fields would fear a decrease in their
ability to attract clients if former clients pursue these avenues. And therefore,
these after-the-fact complaint mechanisms may create an incentive for
careful practice, thus improving the quality of services.
The basic idea behind private-back-end mechanisms is typically twofold.
First, and most relevant to the unhappy consumers who are typically the
people who initiate these mechanisms, they often offer the promise of some
form of compensation or remediation for the injuries allegedly suffered at the
App.2d 2002) (failure to provide "once in a lifetime" professional quality photographs);
Griffin-Amiel v. Frank Terris Orchestras, 677 N.Y.S.2d 908 (N.Y. City Ct. 1998) (failure
to provide wedding singer); Murphy v. Lord Thompson Manor, 938 A.2d 1269 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2008) (canceled reservation date).
33 For more on the BBB's accreditation program, see BETTER BUSINESS BUREAU,
AcCREDITATION STANDARDS (2008), available at http://www.bbb.org/us/bbb-
accreditation-standards/.
34 See, e.g., eBay, Feedback Forum,
http://pages.ebay.com/services/forum/feedback.html (last visited April 28, 2009)
(affording eBay buyers the opportunity to rate sellers by leaving "Feedback" in the form
of a positive, negative, or neutral rating, and a short comment); Rate My Teachers, K-12
Teacher Ratings by Students and Parents, http://www.ratemyteachers.com/ (last visited
April 28, 2009) (providing a forum for rating and commenting on teachers,
administrators, counselors, and other school professionals who affect students'
education); RateltAil, Consumer Reviews, http://www.rateitall.com/ (last visisted April
28, 2009) (providing consumers with an opportunity to leave ratings and reviews for most
products).
202
[Vol. 24:2 20091
FOUR WAYS TO ASSURE MEDIATOR QUALITY (AND WHY NONE WORK)
hands of the service provider. Second, and more relevant to this article's
inquiry, these mechanisms theoretically influence practitioners' actions as
they provide their services. ("If I mess this procedure up, my client can file a
complaint, a lawsuit, or both, so I had better exercise care. .. ") As such,
these private-back-end mechanisms are an important component to quality
assurance in most circumstances.
The combination of these four mechanisms might be summarized with
the following grid:
Table 2: Examples of the Four Ways to Assure Quality Services
Front-End Back-End
(steps aimed at assuring (steps aimed at assuring
quality by limiting the initial quality by punishing or
pool to those practitioners removing from practice
deemed competent or those whose conduct is
qualified) deemed unacceptable)
Public 1. For example, requiring a 2. For example, upon finding
(steps taken by license in order to join the of misconduct, revoking a
the state) practice. license or otherwise banning
a practitioner from future
practice.
Private 3. For example, consumers 4. For example, unhappy
(steps taken by using reputations to make consumers filing a complaint
private parties or hiring decisions. or suing bad practitioners for
organizations) malpractice.
E. The Grid's Omissions and Simplifications
Like any good framework, this one aims to suggest categories that are
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. That is, the framework aims
to cover every possible mechanism, and each possible mechanism should fit
in only one of the categories it offers.
If something challenges this framework, it would be the prospect that
some mechanism might fall somewhere arguably in between the two ends of
one of these axes. For example, what about something that is neither wholly
public nor wholly private, but rather is a combination of the two? Or what
about something that involves monitoring during the service itself, so that it
is neither wholly front-end nor wholly back-end? It is possible that the
framework would be more complete if I included an in-between row and an
in-between column. But that would also produce nine mechanisms to
consider-far more than I think would be useful in an analysis such as this
one.
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Furthermore, it is clear that mechanisms from each of these quadrants
interact with mechanisms in other quadrants. For example, public-back-end
mechanisms often work in tandem with the other mechanisms described in
this framework. A practitioner who loses a license has been removed from
the pool of future practitioners-resembling a public-front-end mechanism. 35
Many state entities that sanction a practitioner do so publicly, and the result
may be that the practitioner will attract fewer clients in the future.36 This
parallels the functioning of private-front-end mechanisms. 37 Finally, in at
least some circumstances, evidence that the state has sanctioned a
practitioner may pave the road to private liability, an example of private-
back-end mechanisms.38  Still, these are conceptually separate (if
interconnected in practice) mechanisms. If this framework presents
something of a simplification or distortion, therefore, I believe it to be a
useful simplification or distortion.
II. WHY NONE OF THE FOUR MECHANISMS WORKS WITH MEDIATION
The collection of mechanisms, private and public, front-end and back-
end, which serve to assure quality in other practice areas should,
theoretically, also assure the quality of mediation services. For the reasons I
describe in this section, however, none of the four quality assurance
mechanisms is as effective in the context of mediation as they are for other
practice areas.
A. Why Public-Front-End Mechanisms Do Not Work
Public-front-end mechanisms fail to form a significant mechanism for
assuring mediator quality for the simple reason that the government has no
ability to exclude anyone from the general practice of mediation.
For public-front-end mechanisms to work, the government must have
some control over who can appear in the pool of people offering services to
the public. In some circumstances, such state control is clear and
longstanding. For example, the government has exclusive control over who
35 See supra Section I.A.
36 State Bar journals routinely publish, for example, notices of Bar members who
have been sanctioned or suspended, along with information about their misconduct.
Whether readers of the Bar journal ignore this information, use it in selecting attorneys,
or merely look at them in a form of collegial rubber-necking, is an empirical question on
which I hesitate to hazard a guess.
37 See supra Section I.C.
38 See supra Section I.D.
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can provide medical services or engage in the practice of medicine. Those
who fail to meet the government's standards cannot practice medicine
without risk of significant state sanction. The same is true of the practice of
law, where the state can influence the quality of lawyering because it can
exclude prospective practitioners from the marketplace. Where the state has
established this exclusive barrier to joining a practice, it can then erect and
enforce all kinds of barriers to entry into the market and requirements for
maintaining a license. Education requirements, entrance exams, continuing
education requirements, and the like are all possible products of a regime in
which the state can say who is in, and who is out, of the pool of providers.
However, the government has no ability to exclude anyone from the
general practice of mediation, and therefore, no licensure system can exist.
Unless the state can draw an exclusive boundary around a practice area, no
license can be required. And unless a license is required, the state has few
front-end options for quality control.
Part of the reason no state has exclusive control over entry into the
mediation marketplace relates to a dynamic I described as the "schmediation
problem" in the Harvard Negotiation Law Review some years ago. 39 In short,
mediation presents a definitional problem. Unless the state can say with
precision what a practice entails, it cannot draw boundaries around a practice.
Without boundaries, there is no way to establish exclusive control.40
Although the enterprise of defining what "mediation" is sounds like a
hollow philosophical exercise, it is so challenging that no sufficient
definition has gained any significant acceptance. Some definitions of
mediation are so narrow that they fail to include many of the things that
people commonly consider as examples of mediation. As a descriptive
matter, therefore, these definitions are unacceptable. For example, many
39 Michael L. Moffitt, Schmediation and the Dimensions of Definition, 10 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REv. 69 (2005).
40 The challenge associated with defining the boundaries of practice is certainly not
unique to mediation. We continue to see evolving understandings of what constitutes the
practice of law, for example. See, e.g., Linda Galler, Problems in Defining and
Controlling the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 44 ARIz. L. REv. 773, 778-79 (2002); see
also Margaret Rentz, Note, Laying Down the Law: Bringing Down the Legal Cartel in
Real Estate Settlement Services and Beyond, 40 GA. L. REv. 293, 299-302 (2005) (real
estate agents); Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Lawyers, Non-Lawyers and Mediation:
Rethinking the Professional Monopoly from a Problem-Solving Perspective, 7 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REv. 235 (2002) (mediators). The medical profession has developed sub-
practices or designations (homeopaths, specialists, alternative practitioners, etc.) to
distinguish among kinds of service providers, but line-drawing challenges persist. See,
e.g., Lori B. Andrews, The Shadow Health Care System: Regulation of Alternative Health
Care Providers, 32 Hous. L. REv. 1273 (1996); Michael H. Cohen, A Fixed Star in Health
Care Reform: The Emerging Paradigm of Holistic Healing, 27 ARIz. ST. L.J. 79 (1995).
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definitions describe the mediator as a "neutral," 41 and yet some of the most
prominent examples of third-parties who intervene in disputes (think, for
example, of Jimmy Carter) bring with them a conspicuously non-neutral set
of interests and agendas. Similarly, the very notion that the mediator must be
a third-party, rather than one of the affected disputing parties, is often open to
challenge.42 Other definitions of mediation are so broad that they unworkably
tread on the turf of other practices. If, for example, mediation is defined as
assisting disputing parties, does anything distinguish mediation from
therapy? Even defining mediation in terms of specific practices does not cure
the problem. I cannot imagine, for example, that we will ever see the day that
a private citizen will face state sanction for the Unauthorized Asking of an
Open-Ended Question.
Even if the state were to adopt a (troublesome) definition of mediation
for purposes of establishing exclusive control over entry into the
marketplace, a second "schmediation" problem arises. The government
might be able to restrict the use of the word "mediation," but there are few
reasons why consumers care what the process or the practitioner is called.
Nothing would stop me from printing up business cards the next day
declaring myself to be a facilitator, consultant, convener, or "schmediator."
Indeed, with the exception of this final example, I have signed contracts and
provided services very much in the nature of mediation under each of these
names. And I am confident my experience in the market is common.
Practitioners and disputing parties sometimes have very good reasons to
avoid categorizing an intervention as a mediation. As a result, even if the
label "mediator" were unavailable, many of the same practices would
continue.
In short, public-front-end quality assurance mechanisms work for many
practices and professions in which the government can limit the pool of
people who are permitted to engage in the practice. Because the government
requires all lawyers to pass the Bar exam, and to swear to uphold certain
ethical principles, the quality of lawyering is improved. Because the state
requires doctors to pass medical Boards, the quality of medical care is
improved. However, because the state cannot prohibit anyone from engaging
in mediation, this category of mechanisms has little effect on the quality of
mediation services.
41 For a discussion of some of the implications of imposing neutrality requirements
on mediation, see Scott R. Peppet, Contractarian Economics and Mediation Ethics: The
Case for Customizing Neutrality Through Contingent Fee Mediation, 82 TEx. L. REv.
227, 253-58 (2003).
42 See, e.g., Hannah Riley Bowles, What Can a Leader Learn from a Mediator?, in
TE HANDBOOK OF DIsPuTE RESOLUTION 409 (Michael Moffltt & Robert Bordone, eds.,
2005).
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B. Why Public-Back-End Mechanisms Do Not Work
If a service provider acts in some obviously unacceptable practice,
public-back-end mechanisms provide for at least a risk that the state will
swoop in and sanction the lousy practitioner in a way that will both remedy
the immediate wrong and serve as a deterrent for other bad actors. The bad
lawyer may be disbarred; the untrustworthy stockbroker may be stripped of
his ability to serve on boards or trade stocks; and the lousy plumber may be
fined. But there is relatively little risk of such state sanctions attaching to
even horrible mediators.
Two dynamics present in mediation make the application of public-back-
end mechanisms problematic. The first reason is an extension of the
implications of mediation having no license (a dynamic I describe in Section
II.A above). Put most simply, because mediators need no license in order to
practice, there is very little the state can threaten to take away from a bad
mediator. In the absence of licensure sanctions, the most the state could do is
threaten mediators with a fine of some sort, a circumstance with few
precedents.
The second, and by far the more significant, obstacle to the effective
operation of public-back-end mechanisms in the context of mediation stems
from mediation's diverse and sometimes ambiguous set of commonly
accepted practices. Before the state can declare someone to have engaged in
punishment-worthy practices, it must have articulated where the boundaries
of acceptable practice are. But no such articulation exists for mediation today
in a way that makes them workable.
Virtually all of the variations among mediators are explained as
variations in practice, style, orientation, or model. Keep the parties together
or apart? There is a theory of mediation to support each decision.43 Give the
parties suggestions or not? Control the process or hand over the reins? Assess
the parties' litigation alternatives? Expand the number of issues? Expand the
number of parties? Push the parties toward settlement? Involve the media?
Set deadlines? And so on. Most of the important decisions a mediator makes
are explainable by one theory or another, and I see no evidence that the
mediation community has concluded that a single answer to these questions
is appropriate. 44
43 See, e.g., CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., MEDIATION: PRACTICE, POLICY, AND
ETHICS 245-48 (2006); Lela P. Love & Stewart E. Sterk, Leaving More Than Money:
Mediation Clauses in Estate Planning Documents, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 539, 574-75
(2008).
44 This diversity of accepted approaches is one of the significant obstacles to
establishing a commonly accepted standard of practice, which in turn makes it difficult
for an unhappy mediation consumer to sue a mediator successfully. See Michael Moffitt,
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
It is not that no one has tried to articulate any of the boundaries of
appropriate mediator conduct. Many different organizations have offered
ethical codes or standards of conduct in one form or another. The most
prominent example of these is the Model Standards of Conduct for
Mediators, a collection of mandates promulgated by the American Bar
Association, the American Arbitration Association, and the Association for
Conflict Resolution. The Model Standards are, in many ways, modeled after
lawyers' ethical codes, which have been used reasonably effectively in
public-back-end efforts at quality control for attorneys. The Model Standards
of Conduct for Mediators, however, are structured in a way that frequently
makes their implementation virtually impossible.45 They provide no
hierarchy of duties; instead, piling dozens of "shalls" and "wills" on
mediators, as though these ideals or principles never come into conflict with
each other in practice. And they provide no interpretive mechanism akin to
Bar Opinions for clarifying the operation of the Standards in real practice. As
a result, the Model Standards, like their cousins in other voluntary mediation
organizations, have little opportunity to provide the kind of clarity that would
permit one to say that a mediator has stepped over the line.
Even if a mediator did violate one of the articulations of an ethical code
like the Model Standards, it is not clear that the government would be able to
swoop in and somehow sanction the mediator. The Model Standards are not
governmental regulations. To the extent they are binding, they are binding
only on those practitioners who are members of the organizations that created
this articulation of ethics, and even then, it is not clear that they are actually
binding.46
Public-back-end mechanisms fail in mediation, therefore, for two
reasons. First, because mediation is an unlicensed practice, the government
has little to take away from lousy mediators. Second, no clear standards exist
Suing Mediators, 83 B.U. L. REv. 147, 153-59 (2003).
45 For a more thorough critique of the Model Standards, see Michael Moffitt, The
Wrong Model, Again: Why the Devil is Not in the Details of the New Model Standards,
Disp. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2006, at 31. But see Joseph B. Stulberg, The Model Standards
of Conduct: A Reply to Professor Moffitt, DIsp. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2006, at 34.
46 1 am not aware of any instances in which organizations sponsoring the Model
Standards have revoked the membership of a mediator for failing to adhere to the
Standards. I am not aware of any state action against a mediator for failing to adhere to a
voluntary organization's standards. And I am not aware of any private lawsuits in which
a plaintiff successfully argued that a mediator's failure to adhere to a voluntary
organization's standards constituted a compensable breach of duty. Absent any of these, I
am comfortable concluding that the Standards are not binding, in at least the legal sense. I
acknowledge, nevertheless, that standards such as these may serve other functions.
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for determining which mediator practices are sufficiently lousy to warrant
any state sanctions that may be available.
C. Why Private-Front-End Mechanisms Do Not Work
The fact that the government has only limited opportunities for assuring
the quality of mediation services does not mean that nothing could possibly
assure the quality of mediation services. After all, private actors' influences
hold the key in many practice areas or professions. For several reasons,
however, private-front-end mechanisms are not as functional in the context
of mediation as they may be in other areas.
The most prominent example of a private-front-end quality control
mechanism is the reputational market that drives (or at least influences)
consumers' choices of mediators. I do not suggest that the market for
mediators is entirely broken. After all, as I tell my students, because no
licensure regime exists for mediators, everyone could go out and print
business cards declaring themselves to be mediators. I caution them,
however, that few are likely to make a living at it right away. And I have yet
to learn that my cautionary words were unfounded.
In this sense, perhaps, the market for mediators is functional. This is the
most common conclusion offered to me when I have spoken with groups of
practicing mediators on the topic. In my experience, mediators who have
successful, full-time practices have an almost unquestioning confidence in
the marketplace and in reputations.
I am at least somewhat more skeptical about the degree to which the
reputational market functions for mediators. It is not that I believe all of the
successful mediators with whom I have spoken are deluding themselves
("The market has rewarded me, and I'm great. The market must work.").
And it is not that I am engaging in a version of academic sour grapes (I turn
down the vast majority of requests I receive to mediate cases these days.).
What gives me pause, personally, is that some of the calls I receive from
disputants wanting to hire me as a mediator describe mediations for which I
personally believe I cannot be the most appropriate mediator. "Surely there
are others in the marketplace who would be better equipped to mediate that
particular case," I think to myself, "and yet I am the one getting the call."
Something is not quite right with the market.
I do not claim, therefore, that the reputational market is entirely
dysfunctional, nor do I proclaim complete confidence in its functioning. I
know of no empirical research on the mediator selection process in the
general marketplace. 47 What I am left with, therefore, is an analysis of the
47 Such research, if done well, would be an enormous contribution to the field.
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character of the market, based on what we do know about the context(s) in
which mediators practice. Several aspects of that analysis suggest caution in
equating mediators' success in the marketplace with the quality of their
services.
First, the indicators of quality for mediators are not nearly as
conspicuous as they may be for other practitioners. If I am to choose a hair
stylist, I can get some idea about his or her skill by looking at the coiffures of
the stylists' other clients. If I am to choose a landscaper, I can look at the
jobs he or she has done in my neighborhood. How is a consumer to know
whether a mediator delivers high-quality services? Settlement rates? 48
Experience as a mediator?49 Experience as something other than a
mediator? 50 Age?51 Education? 52 Each of these proxies for quality may have
some legitimacy. A mediator who has never settled a case, who has never
held a professional position, who is twelve years old, and in middle school
would be a terrible choice to mediate a complex commercial dispute. But
48 Settlement rates are a misleading figure for a variety of reasons. They fail to
capture information about whether the mediator was skilled in crafting an efficient,
value-laden deal. They fail to capture information about whether the kinds of cases the
mediator has been settling are structurally similar to the specific case for which the
consumer wants to hire a mediator. They are prone to selection bias-if I know I am to be
evaluated on the basis of settlement rates, I am less likely to accept the hard cases.
49 Experience alone is, at best, circular as a proxy for quality. "This mediator is
skilled because she has experience, which she must have gotten because she's skilled."
50 1 have heard no shortage of practitioners and commentators describe what one
"must" have in order to be a good mediator, and often, I am told that one "must" have
experience as a non-mediator: "Only an experienced litigator can settle big-money
lawsuits"; "Only someone steeped in public finance could resolve this kind of dispute";
"A mediator must have training in psychology in order to settle these emotionally-
charged cases effectively." And so on. These assertions are problematic, at least, because
there are many skilled mediators without these credentials settling precisely these kinds
of cases. I am positive that there is no particular training or experience that is necessary
to mediate effectively. Furthermore, I am positive that training or experience in
something other than mediation does not necessarily make one an effective mediator.
51 Longevity suggests genetic good fortune, but it is not clear that it is a reliable
proxy for skill as a mediator. I know some skilled and highly successful full-time
mediators in their 30s; I know some skilled and highly successful full-time mediators in
their 60s; and I know examples of unskilled and unsuccessful mediators of all ages.
52 A mediator's educational background, whether an indication of mediation-
specific training or education in some other discipline, may present some useful
information. Education may be a proxy for certain information that would be relevant to a
consumer-for example, knowledge, intelligence, or persistence. But proxies based on
education almost certainly exclude some of the most highly skilled and valuable
mediators, and probably do so in a way that is socio-economically skewed.
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beyond screening the most conspicuously inappropriate practitioners, the
available proxies for an individual mediator's quality are severely limited.
A second reason for caution about the functionality of the reputational
markets for mediators stems from the often stringent confidentiality that
attaches to mediation processes. In most contexts, mediations take place
under contractual and statutory confidentiality regimes. The precise nature of
the confidentiality that attaches to a given mediation is highly jurisdiction-
specific and is beyond the scope of this article. But it is fair to say that
mediation differs from many practices or professions in that very little
information is available about what mediators have done in previous cases. If
I seek to hire a contractor for a large job, I might go and look at previous jobs
he or she has done. If I seek to choose an appellate attorney, I might go and
look at previous cases he or she has argued. But a mediator's record will
often be very limited because of confidentiality rules. And the information
that is available (things like number of cases and whether they settled) is
limited in its utility for the reasons described immediately above.
Third, mediators' reputations are largely limited to individual (rather
than collective) reputations because most mediators operate as solo
practitioners or as members of very small firms. Multiple factors offer
explanations of this dynamic. Mediation is not as obviously scalable as legal
work or accounting work. It is difficult to imagine a senior partner mediator,
a junior partner mediator, and multiple associate mediators working on most
of the kinds of cases mediators handle. Mediators who are attorneys also face
considerable conflict-of-interest ethical rules that make association with law
firms a challenging business model. 53 As a result of the prominence of solo
practice or small firms, mediation consumers cannot reliably use the quality
of a mediator's firm, in most cases, as a proxy for the quality of the
individual mediator.
Fourth, reputational markets tend to work best when they involve repeat
players and multiple iterations, neither of which is necessarily present in the
market for mediators. Without repeat players, the only way that reputations
matter is if there is considerable publicity about reputations. In the case of
some mediations, the lawyers can play this role because even if the named
53 For illustrations of cases in which a mediator's service resulted in conflicts
imputations, see McKenzie Construction v. St. Croix Storage Corp., 961 F. Supp. 857,
862 (V.I. 1997) (held that a mediator who was later hired by the plaintiff's firm, imputed
the firm and could not be insulated by a "cone of silence"); Matluck v. Matluck, 825 So.
2d 1071, 1073 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (disqualifying ex-mediator's law firm from
representing a husband in post-dissolution proceedings). See also John G. Bickerman,
Leaving the Firm, DisP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 1998, at 24, 24-25; John R. Van Winkle,
Excerpt from Mediation: A Path Back for the Lost Lawyer, EXPERIENCE, Winter 2002, at
34, 34-37.
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disputants are not repeat players, their attorneys may be.54 But it would be a
mistake to imagine that all mediations take place in a context in which both
parties are represented, much less represented by counsel who are repeat
consumers of mediation. Furthermore, unless a consumer has multiple
experiences with mediation, it is even more challenging for that consumer to
make a judgment about the quality of the mediation services he or she has
received. If a consumer has only ever hired one mediator, and that mediator
settled the case, how is the consumer to judge whether the mediator is
skilled? Only with comparative information is reputational information
robust.
Again, my thesis is not that mediation consumers have no bases for
distinguishing one mediator from another. But there are enough flaws in the
reputational market that we should be reluctant to trust that the market will
simply reward those mediators who are skilled and filter out those who are
not.
D. Why Private-Back-End Mechanisms Do Not Work
The final of the four mechanisms involves private-back-end actions, and
the most prominent example of these is the opportunity that unhappy
consumers have to file malpractice actions against mediators. The theory
behind this mechanism is that private lawsuits both provide compensation to
the immediate victims and deter future malpractice by mediators because of
the publicity associated with the successful malpractice action. For a variety
of reasons, mediators operate with virtual immunity from liability, and as a
result, this mechanism has little effect on the quality of mediator services.
Mediators enjoy de jure immunity from liability in many jurisdictions
and enjoy defacto immunity in virtually all contexts. Examples of successful
lawsuits against mediators are extraordinarily rare, particularly in light of the
number of cases going through mediation each year. To be clear, I do not
believe the rarity of lawsuits against mediators is evidence that mediators
never commit errors. Instead, after several years of research on the topic, I
concluded that the rarity of lawsuits against mediators is evidence that
lawsuits against mediators virtually never present attractive prospects for
recovery. 55
54 See Jeffrey H. Goldfien & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, What if the Lawyers Have
Their Way? An Empirical Assessment of Conflict Strategies and Attitudes Toward
Mediation Styles, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 277, 285-86 (2007) (examining
attorneys' roles in mediator selection).
55 See generally Moffitt, supra note 44.
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As I explain in a pair of articles entitled Suing Mediators, and Ten Ways
to Get Sued: A Guide for Mediators, mediators present unattractive
malpractice-lawsuit targets for at least four reasons. 5 6 First, it is difficult for
an unhappy mediation consumer to demonstrate that a mediator has breached
a particular duty.5 7 Absent a breach of duty, no liability will attach. Second,
an unhappy mediation customer has a hard time demonstrating the
mediator's actions caused any particular harm.58 Third, mediation parties
have a real challenge demonstrating injury substantial enough to warrant the
costs involved in seeking to recover damages through a malpractice action. 59
Fourth, even if a plaintiff overcame all of the above obstacles, many
mediators enjoy a form of immunity: whether contractual, statutory qualified
immunity, or common law quasi-judicial immunity. 60 The combination of
these factors explains the virtual absence of malpractice suits against
mediators, even though mediation practice involves hundreds of thousands of
cases per year by the most conservative estimates.
No fully reliable mechanisms exist for quantifying the number of
lawsuits filed against mediators on an annual basis. Available information,
however, strongly suggests that the theoretical difficulty I describe above is
borne out in practice. State and federal reporters are virtually bare of
malpractice complaints against mediators.61 Furthermore, mediation
56 1d; Michael Moffitt, Ten Ways to Get Sued A Guide for Mediators, 8 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 81 (2003).
57 Theoretically, a mediator's duty may be established through common law tort
principles, through contractual undertakings, or even through statutory mandates on the
mediator. In most instances, however, even an unfortunate set of mediator actions is
unlikely to constitute a clear violation of any of these. See Moffitt, supra note 44, at 153-
67.
58 Causation is difficult in the context of mediator misconduct because either (1) the
case did not result in a settlement, in which case the aggrieved party would have
enormous challenges proving that but for the mediator's actions, the case would have
settled, or (2) the case settled, in which case the complaining party would have enormous
difficulties in establishing that but for the mediator's actions, the case would have settled
on terms more favorable to the complaining party. See id. at 175-82.
59 An unhappy party might be able to establish that a mediator wasted the parties'
time, making the mediator's fee at risk. But the real money-the kind of money that
would make a malpractice lawsuit attractive to a plaintiffs attorney for example-would
be available only if the plaintiff could demonstrate some larger injury. Thus, absent the
most egregious conduct, any damages would likely be limited to the time wasted.
60 For more on mediator immunity, see Scott H. Hughes, Mediator Immunity: The
Misguided and Inequitable Shifting of Risk, 83 OR. L. REv. 107 (2004); Moffitt, supra
note 44, at 173-75.
61 Of course, reported cases form only a small percentage of cases filed. Still, a
review of secondary and associational sources confirms the same basic understanding;
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malpractice insurance remains available to practitioners for a tiny fraction of
the cost of malpractice insurance in other practice areas or professions. This
suggests that actions against mediators are rare or that actions against
mediators produce little exposure to significant liability. I strongly suspect
that the reality is both of these conditions are true.
Even if malpractice actions serve to deter bad behavior in those who fear
that they might be the targets of future malpractice actions, the fact that such
cases are extremely rare in the context of mediation suggests that this
mechanism does not serve as much of a mediation quality-assurance
mechanism.
III. WHAT WOULD HAVE TO CHANGE FOR THE FOUR MECHANISMS TO
BE EFFECTIVE WITH MEDIATION
The original draft of this article had only the two sections above, and its
title was "The Four Ways to Assure Mediation Quality (and why none of
them will work)." In essence, without realizing it, I was suggesting that
mediation would remain forever beyond the reach of quality assurance
mechanisms.
After re-examining the evolution of other practice areas and professions,
however, I arrive at a different conclusion: Mediation is not permanently
beyond the reach of formal and informal quality assurance mechanisms. It is
merely beyond their effective reach right now.
Something will change. One or more of the current dynamics I describe
above, which renders these mechanisms ineffective, will change. The
interesting question is what that change may look like.
In the four sections below, I describe the conditions that would need to
exist for each of the four quality assurance mechanisms to function more
fully. I am not predicting that all of these changes will occur. Indeed, I think
that some of these changes are mutually exclusive. What I describe,
therefore, is more in the nature of a smorgasbord, an array of different
possible future conditions-one or more of which is likely to emerge as
mediation evolves and matures.
malpractice lawsuits against mediators are extraordinarily rare. See also Jim Coben,
Mediation Case Law Project, http://law.hamline.edu/adr/mediation-case-law-project.html
(last visited April 28, 2009) (a treasure-trove cataloguing litigation involving mediators
over the recent years).
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A. Making Public-Front-End Mechanisms Work
Two different possible dynamics could cause public-front-end
mechanisms to work more robustly in the context of mediation. First, if
mediation ever became a licensed practice, the state would have the
opportunities for firont-end screening it currently enjoys in other licensed
practices. Second, if mediators' work depended more thoroughly on referrals
from a government entity, then even in the absence of a generalized license,
the state could establish standards and barriers to market entry akin to those it
imposes on other licensed practices.
1. Mediation Licenses
For all the reasons I describe above in section II.A., I am deeply skeptical
that the government could establish or enforce any barrier to entry into the
marketplace for the general practice of mediation. Too many varied
practices, in too many contexts, are commonly considered "mediation"
today. The diplomat, the retired judge, the schoolyard peacekeeper, the
volunteer in small claims court, and the disinterested expert hired by both
disputants can all reasonably claim to be "mediators." 62 I doubt any
legislative effort would change this parlance, and I doubt the political
incentives would be sufficient to try to establish a wholesale prohibition
against the Unlicensed Practice of Mediation.
But what if the government took the back door-seeking many of the
same effects as licensure, but without an official license? What if the state
did not try to establish a licensure regime, but instead afforded certain
benefits or protections only to those mediators who satisfy a set of
government-established standards? That would accomplish many, though not
all, of the same quality assurance aims as licensure.
The most conspicuous possible vehicle for such a public-front-end
mechanism would be the state-created and state-enforced system of
confidentiality protections. If mediation consumers cared so much about
confidentiality protections that they sought services on the basis of which
providers could assure confidentiality, and if the only reliable mechanism for
assuring confidentiality was through statutory means, then the state might
enjoy control akin to a license. The only way mediators could practice
(which requires getting clients) would be to adhere to whatever conditions
the state establishes.
62 See Moffitt, supra note 39 (distinguishing between prescriptive and descriptive
definitional patterns with respect to mediation).
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This is not entirely far-fetched. It is not difficult to imagine that more
states might move away from enforcing common law and contractual
mediation confidentiality protections, in favor of statutory protections like
those in the Uniform Mediation Act.63 And if they do so, and if the
marketplace demands that mediators provide confidentiality assurances, then
states could insert additional requirements for the purpose of limiting the
pool of people who would enjoy the protections. 64
2. Source-Point Restrictions
A second public-front-end measure, shy of full licensure, would be a
condition in which the government itself was the source of mediators' work,
and therefore, the government could establish conditions for receiving that
mediation work. I label these "source-point restrictions." It stands to reason
that if the government is referring work to non-governmental actors, the
government can restrict who receives the work. Indeed, the government
probably has to set standards, since there must be some basis on which the
government allocates the work. And so, although the government cannot
require that every mediator meet a set of standards in order to practice, it can
require that every mediator who wants work from the government meet that
set of standards. In this way, the government accomplishes at least part of
what it might with a licensure regime.
Examples of source-point restrictions already exist. Some mediation
programs achieve de facto source-point restrictions by using only their own
employees. For example, the Ninth Circuit Appellate Mediation Program
staffs all of its mediations with mediators employed by the appellate
mediation program itself.65 It is common, however, for mediation programs
63 To date, ten states have adopted some version of the UMA. See Uniform Law
Commissioners, A Few Facts About The Uniform Mediation Act,
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-uma2001 .asp (last
visited April 28, 2009).
64 For example, states might include a different, more limited definition of who
constitutes a "mediator" under UMA § 2 for purposes of limiting the availability of
confidentiality protections. Or states might revise UMA § 3 for purposes of carving out
additional exceptions to the scope of coverage. Although the UMA is a product of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, it is common for an
individual state to tailor some aspects of the proposed uniform law to the specific needs
of that state. See, e.g., Gary Provencher, The Uniform Mediation Act: An Analysis of
Current State Acts, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/jdr/mayhew-hite/vol5issl/student.html (last
visited April 28, 2009) (reporting on state variations in their adoption of the UMA).
65 See Gilbert J. Ginsburg, The Case for a Mediation Program in the Federal
Circuit, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 1379, 1382-89 (2001) (discussing the appellate mediation
programs in several different circuits).
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to use outside mediators, either volunteers or paid roster mediators. In those
circumstances, the program establishing or maintaining the roster has every
opportunity to establish membership qualifications. For example, even in the
federal appellate system, the D.C. Circuit Appellate Mediation Program uses
only volunteer mediators, and requires that they all be members of the Bar
with experience litigating. 66 Presumably, the Ninth Circuit's hiring decisions
and the D.C. Circuit's restrictions on eligibility stem from a desire to assure
the quality of the services their mediators provide.
To be clear, the trend is not uniformly toward more restrictive
governmental standards for court-affiliated mediation programs. For
example, Florida maintained rules for almost twenty years that limited the
pool of Circuit Court Mediators to members in good standing of the Florida
Bar with at least five years of Florida practice, and to retired trial judges who
had presided for at least five years.67 The Florida Supreme Court recently
dropped the requirement that these mediators be attorneys, in favor of a
multi-factored point-based system, in which educational background is only
one of several basic considerations. 68
Nevertheless, the basic idea that the state might be an important source
of cases for mediators is entirely conceivable. And the idea that the state, as
the source of work for mediators, might set some quality-driven eligibility
standards for receiving cases is also entirely predictable. Therefore, even
though no state is likely to establish a complete licensure regime for
mediation generally, it may accomplish many of the goals of a public-front-
end mechanism through other means.
B. Making Public-Back-End Mechanisms Work
Two different possible circumstances could develop that would increase
the effectiveness of public-back-end mechanisms in the context of mediation.
66 See id. at 1382-86; U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Appellate
Mediation Program, http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/intemet/home.nsf/Content/Stub+-
+Appellate+Mediation+Program (last visited April 28, 2009).
67 It was the original adoption of this rule that prompted Jim Alfimi to write his
widely-recognized "Is This the End of 'Good Mediation"' article. See James J. Alfini,
Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing it Out: Is This the End of "Good Mediation "?, 19 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 47, 56 (1991).
68 See Fla. R. for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators R. 10.100 (amended
2007), available at http://www.flcourts.org/gen_public/adr/certrules.shtml (listing
training, education, experience through supervised employment or mentorship, and a set
of miscellaneous considerations); see also In re Petition of the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Rules and Policy Committee on Amendments to Florida Rules for Certified
and Court-Appointed Mediators, 969 So. 2d 1003, 1006-10 (Fla. 2007).
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The first possibility involves the government developing a license or a
set of source-point restrictions that have the equivalent function. As I discuss
above, I think that full licensure across all contexts is extremely unlikely. But
the government is already moving toward establishing limits on the pool of
potential mediators in specific contexts. It would not be difficult at all for
source-point restrictions to include barriers to entry into the marketplace and
conditions in which otherwise eligible mediators would be excluded (for
example, for bad practices). 69 For example, North Carolina's district courts
have established minimum education and experience requirements for all of
its certified mediators, and it has established a procedure for filing
complaints against court-certified mediators, with one possible sanction
being de-certification. 70 Such complaint mechanisms might have an effect on
mediator quality even in the absence of any licensure or quasi-licensure
regime. For example, if a state were to get into the business of certifying (and
decertifying) mediators generally, then in theory, the state could threaten to
withdraw its certification in the event a mediator engaged in misbehavior. 71
The second possible condition would be one in which the state began to
extract binding commitments from mediators who were being prosecuted for
some form of misconduct that they would no longer engage in the practice of
mediation. The parallel here would be with the SEC's plea agreements with
financial analysts or people who wish to serve as directors of public
companies. I have a hard time envisioning what mediators might do that
would cause the kind of government attention required to cause this to occur,
and I have a hard time envisioning how the agreement never to mediate again
69 The most extensive current research on mediator complaint mechanisms comes
from Paula Young. See Paula Young, Take It or Leave It. Lump It or Grieve It: Designing
Mediator Complaint Systems that Protect Mediators, Unhappy Parties, Attorneys,
Courts, the Process, and the Field, 21 OHIO ST. J. Disp. RESOL. 721 (2006); see also
Charles Pou, Jr., Assuring Excellence, or Merely Reassuring? Policy and Practice in
Promoting Mediator Quality, 2004 J. Disp. RESOL. 303 (2005).
70 For more on the North Carolina district court mediation program, see North
Carolina Dispute Resolution Commission,
http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/DRC/Default.asp (last visited April 28,
2009).
71 There have also been a number of private, non-state entities that have at least
begun the process of certifying mediators. For example, the International Mediation
Institute has recently begun a campaign to certify mediators around the world according
to a single standard. See International Mediation Institute Mediator Competency
Certification, http://www.imimediation.org/?clD=standardsmain (last April 28, 2009).
Note that both state-created and privately-issued certifications rely on the market's
perception of their value in order to function. If the market is indifferent to whether a
mediator holds a particular certificate, the certificate does little to affect the quality of
mediation services.
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would be drafted or enforced. Still, in the same way that the government can
exercise public-back-end controls on even those practitioners who do not
work in licensed practices, such a mechanism is at least theoretically possible
for mediators.
C. Making Private-Front-End Mechanisms Work
Two different developments could result in an increase in the extent to
which private-front-end mechanisms would effectively assure mediator
quality. Consumers would need to have access to greater information about
individual mediators, or mediators would need to be grouped in a way that
consumers could use their organizational affiliations as reliable proxies for
quality. 72
It is possible that mediation consumers will begin to have access to
greater information about individual mediators' performances. The Better
Business Bureau and its equivalents have long served something of a
clearinghouse function, and perhaps it will become more active in monitoring
mediators' services. But the highly decentralized internet has transformed
consumers' expectations in many sectors. Today, through voluntary rating
systems involving stars, smiley-faces, and the like, consumers have at least
rough information about many previous consumers' experiences. If I am
purchasing a used book through amazon.com, I am presented with
information about a number of different sellers, including the price they will
charge me for the book, their shipping policies, and a breakdown of the
ratings each vendor's former customers have assigned to it. Even more
decentralized are the highly-publicized "consumer vigilante" videos
disgruntled former customers may post on the internet, showing a company
in an embarrassingly negative light.73 Confidentiality may limit some of what
mediation clients can convey about their experiences, but I am reasonably
72 A third possibility is at least theoretically possible, although I treat its likelihood
as significantly more remote. It is possible that, just as with doctors, insurance companies
or other private organizations might increase their influence over the pools of potential
mediators and over their practices. This condition would develop only if mediators had
reason to fear increases in mediation premiums or the revocation of malpractice insurance
altogether, and I have seen no evidence of the kind of variability in issuing or pricing
mediation malpractice insurance to support the idea that any such development is
imminent.
73 For a fascinating discussion of the increased power of disgruntled, individual
consumers who are willing to invest time in taking their complaints public, see Jena
McGregor, Consumer Vigilantes: Memo to Corporate America: Hell Now Hath No Fury
like a Customer Scorned, Bus. WK., Mar. 3, 2008, at 38.
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sure that enterprising and unhappy consumers might find a way to convey
information that would affect future consumers' choices in mediators.
A second possibility is that the market of mediation providers will
consolidate itself in ways that would see the development of more robust
branding. As I explain above in section II.C, I do not currently see a business
model that would make such market consolidation viable. 74 Still, the fact that
mediation is not currently organized into large firms is no evidence that it
will not be. Two decades ago, the largest 250 law firms employed just fewer
than 45,000 attorneys, and today the largest 250 law firms employ more than
125,000 attorneys, often in branch offices spread around the country and
around the world.75
If mediators were to cluster into fewer, larger firms, we would almost
certainly begin to see the market differentiating among the firms. The firms'
reputations would then serve as proxies for the quality of its mediators, and
the firms would then have strong incentives to make quality-assurance an
internal priority. Consider, for example, the evolution of the market for
management consulting. An unlicensed practice, like mediation, management
consulting services comes in a virtually infinite range of approaches, quality,
and pricing. The corporate executive who decides to spend more than a
million dollars a month to hire a team of McKinsey consultants does not do
so because he or she knows all of the team members individually. Instead, he
or she relies on McKinsey's reputation and trusts that McKinsey will have
done the work internally to assure that their consultants will meet client
expectations. Might the day come when a disputant (or a disputant's
attorney) would know that a mediator who works with X firm represents a
lower-priced option, that a mediator who works with Y firm reliably has the
greatest responsiveness to customer idiosyncrasies, and that a mediator from
firm Z will have the highest public profile?
Short of actual market consolidation, a final possibility is that voluntary
associations will come to provide consumers with information about the
quality of mediators. Might one of the major dispute resolution associations
74 Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc. (JAMS) may represent a current
exception to this observation. Their business focuses almost exclusively on one specific
type of mediation. And at least partially as a result, in that narrowed market space, the
consumers and providers are almost all multiple-iteration repeat players. As a result of
this narrowly defined universe of actors, JAMS may already demonstrate the
functionality of private-front-end mechanisms. I would have even greater confidence in
the functionality of the reputational market in this sector if there were multiple, similarly-
sized and situated competitors to JAMS.
75 See Leigh Jones, Another Growth Spurt for Firms, THE NAT'L L.J., Nov. 12,
2007; Samuel Miller et al., Conflicts of Interest in Corporate Litigation, 48 Bus. LAW.
141 (1992).
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get into the business of certifying mediators? 76 Might it monitor members'
behavior or otherwise take steps to assure the quality of the services of its
certified members? For this to come about, the organization would need to go
through the difficult process of deciding on criteria for certification. Of
course, certification from a voluntary association matters only if consumers
believe that certification from the organization means something beyond,
"Your annual dues check didn't bounce." In fact, certification would need to
mean something more than merely satisfying eligibility criteria that would be
evident to any consumer even in the absence of a certificate. It would not
have much effect on consumers, for example, if all one needed to qualify for
a certificate was to be a member in good standing of the Bar, since any
consumer would have ready access to that information anyway. But it is
conceivable that a prominent voluntary association might establish, enforce,
and publicize certification criteria-and that the market would care. If this
happened, it would be an example of a private-front-end mechanism
contributing to assuring mediator quality.
A variant on this possibility might present a hybrid public-private
mechanism. Courts increasingly order parties to mediation-for example
through consensual orders crafted in conjunction with Rule 16 conferences or
their state equivalents. What if the mutually agreed upon mediator named in
one of these orders is a member of one of these voluntary associations that
promulgates a set of standards of conduct? What if the mediator specifically
promises to adhere to those standards? What if the standards were
incorporated into the court's order? It would be reasonably easy to foresee a
situation in which the state would then find itself at least potentially in the
business of enforcing privately-developed standards of conduct, creating
something of a public-private hybrid mechanism for quality assurance.
77
76 For an example of what the evolution of such a conversation might look like,
consider the work of the Task Force on Mediation Certification from the Association for
Conflict Resolution. That Task Force, formed in 2002, finalized its report and
recommendations in 2004, and the association undertook a feasibility study in 2005. See
ACR Mediator Certification Task Force, Report and Recommendations to the ACR
Board of Directors (2004), available at
http://www.acmet.org/about/taskforces/certification.htm.
77 1 have heard at least anecdotally of courts considering enforcing standards of
conduct on mediations that take place outside of the context of a court order, merely on
the basis that the litigated case rests within the jurisdiction of the court. I am at a loss to
explain, procedurally, how the court's authority would extend in this way. But if such a
development were to occur, it would still further expand the prospect of a public-private
blurring.
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D. Making Private-Back-End Mechanisms Work
In order for private-back-end mechanisms to play a stronger role in the
assurance of mediator quality, we would probably have to see a truly
creative, almost impossibly bad set of facts emerge from at least one
mediation gone awry. We would not, however, necessarily need to see such
facts frequently. Even one case could have significant effects on mediators'
practices.
Consistent with the analysis I presented in Section II.D, above, a path-
breaking mediator liability case would almost certainly involve:
1. A mediator who engages in conduct that conspicuously and
unquestionably violates one or more of the duties the mediator owes to
someone. The duty might appear specifically in the mediator's poorly-drafted
mediation agreement, or it might stem from some widely-recognized
standard of practice in the community.
2. A mediator whose conduct is the direct cause of injury-most
likely injury to one of the parties, though it could be that the mediator's
conduct injures a non-party. This would have to be something more than just
a mediator asking bad questions or steering the conversation in an
unfortunate way. Instead, the mediator would probably have to take some
terrible action that caused immediate injury.
3. At least one of those injured by the mediator sustains injuries
serious enough to make the injured party willing to pursue a malpractice
action against the mediator. This could happen because the injury was severe
enough that the disputant's financial incentive (or that of its insurance
company) supports a litigation strategy. Or it could be that the injured party
was both sufficiently wealthy and sufficiently outraged to pursue litigation
even without independent economic incentive.
4. The events take place in a context and in a jurisdiction in which
the mediator does not enjoy any form of immunity. The state would have to
refuse to enforce contractual waivers, if any were present. And the mediation
would have to have taken place outside of the protections of statutory or
common-law immunity.
5. The litigated mediator malpractice case must be resolved in a way
that is open to publicity. Early disposition on a procedural matter would not
serve a quality-assurance function. Nor would settlement serve a quality-
assurance function, if the settlement and the facts underlying the agreement
were not available for full public consideration. The case would have to be
settled with full disclosure or resolved on its merits, with the latter having the
greatest impact if the party complaining of mediator misconduct prevails.
This combination of developments is, understandably, quite unlikely in
any given mediation. But hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of
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mediations take place every year-enough that it would be dangerous to
imagine that such a combination could never occur. And, from a quality-
assurance perspective, the mediation community's behavior would very
likely be affected even if this combination only happened once.78 Partially
out of an interest in risk-management, and probably partially as a form of
professional voyeurism, I am confident that mediators would pay careful
attention to the fates of those who are sued successfully for malpractice. This
private-back-end mechanism for mediator quality assurance could, therefore,
work.
IV. CONCLUSION
Over time, every practice or profession falls under the influence of one
or more of four possible quality control mechanisms. Some become subject
to licensure regimes-a public-front-end mechanism that seeks to assure
quality by restricting the pool of service providers. Some practitioners
become subject to state sanctions for misbehavior-a public-back-end
mechanism that seeks to assure quality by removing the worst offenders from
practice. Some practitioners become influenced heavily by consumers'
reputation-driven choices in markets-a private-front-end mechanism that
seeks to assure quality by relying on the availability of accurate information
about practices of service providers. And some practitioners restructure their
practices in ways that minimize their exposure to liability for malpractice-a
private-back-end mechanism that seeks to assure quality by creating
disincentives for misbehavior.
Today, most mediators operate without significant influence from any of
these quality-assurance mechanisms. But something will change.
No significant practice or profession operates so thoroughly outside of all
four of these quality-assurance mechanisms as mediation currently does.
Some practices operate under the influence of all four mechanisms. For
example, physicians operate under the conspicuous influence of all four: they
have to pass entrance examinations in order to secure a license; they are at
78 It might be unfortunate to imagine that one case against one mediator might have
an impact on an entire field's practice. After all, if the idea that "bad cases make bad law"
holds true, and if it is only a truly bad case that would result in mediator liability, then
that might suggest caution in making too much meaning out of a single case. But right
now, the slate is essentially clean. And it seems at least likely to me that we would see
considerable anchoring around whatever principles are articulated in the first case.
Perhaps at some point, we will see so many cases alleging mediator malpractice that a
single successful case will attract no attention. We are not currently in that condition.
Mediators, insurers, program administrators, and probably even consumers would pay
attention today.
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risk of losing their licenses if they engage in misconduct; their prospective
clients have access to considerable information about their practices and
reputations; and they are exposed to private liability for malpractice. Other
practices may rely more heavily on only one or a few of these mechanisms.
But they all have something promoting, if not assuring, quality.
The fact that mediation operates without any of these mechanisms, and
therefore, the fact that something will change with respect to mediation, is no
indictment of mediation. I certainly do not intend to suggest that mediators
operate as a band of rogues, committing malpractice with indifference. Many
mediators are outstanding. Still more are at least well-intentioned. Mediation
is merely undergoing a process of speciation and maturation at this moment.
That developmental process is occurring under the influence of complex
market forces, periodic government attention, and the self-interested
attentions of many different established professions and practices. It is no
wonder that something is going to change. In fact, many aspects of mediation
are likely to change in the coming years.
This analysis suggests at least two follow-up questions:
One is a predictive question: What aspects of mediation or the context in
which mediation takes place are most likely to change? I am reluctant to
suggest that my crystal ball functions better than any other observer's. Based
on my research into other fields' developments, however, my best guess is
that some changes (like increased source-point restrictions and increased
reputational information) are more likely than others (like licensure or
market consolidation).
The second is a normative question: What aspects of mediation or the
context(s) in which mediation takes place should change? On this, I remain
almost as conflicted as I was when I began this inquiry several years ago.
Given the complexities of mediation practice and the importance of
maintaining diversity among those practices, I cannot bring myself to hope
for an increased quality-assurance role for the state, with the possible
exception of governmental source-point restrictions. I think we too often
conflate the concepts of "progress" and "regulation." And I am virtually
certain that regulation would diminish innovation and diversity in approaches
to mediation. Reluctantly, therefore, and with a robust appreciation for the
flaws present in the market, I think the private side of the equation offers
more potential.
Conversations about quality assurance and mediation have only just
begun. Those conversations will improve with an understanding of the four
basic mechanisms potentially available for assuring the quality of mediators'
services.
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